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Daniels School Faculty

Brian Roberson

Brian Roberson

Professor of Economics
Department Head of Economics
Senior Associate Dean

Education

Ph.D., Economics, Purdue University
M.S., Applied Mathematics, Texas Tech University, 2001
B.A., Engineering, Texas Tech University, 1999

CV

Professor Roberson's main teaching interests are game theory and microeconomic theory.  His research interests are economic theory, game theory, political economy, and public economics.  Professor Roberson received his Ph.D. from Purdue University in 2005.  

Journal Articles

  • Hudja, S.G, Roberson, B., & Rosokha, Y. (2023). "Public Leaderboard Feedback in Sampling Competition: an Experimental Investigation." Review of Economics and Statistics | Related Website |
  • Gelder, A, Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B. (2022). "All-Pay Auctions with Ties." Economic Theory vol. 74 pages1183–1231. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D., Roberson, B. & Sheremeta, R. (2019). "The attack and defense of weakest-link networks." Public Choice | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2018). "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets." Economic Inquiry | Related Website |
  • Boyer, P, Konrad, K. & Roberson, B. (2017). "Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities." Journal of Mathematical Economics | Related Website |
  • Rietzke, D. & Roberson, B (2013). "The Robustness of 'Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend' Alliances." Social Choice and Welfare vol. 40 (4), 937-956. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2012). "Coalitional Colonel Blotto Games with Application to the Economics of Alliances." Journal of Public Economic Theory vol. 14 (4), 653-676. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2012). "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment." Defence & Peace Economics vol. 23 507-515. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2012). "Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder." Defence & Peace Economics vol. 23 521-524. | Related Website |
  • Roberson, B. & Kvasov, D (2012). "The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game." Economic Theory (51), 397-434. | Related Website |
  • Arce, D.G., Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2012). "Weakest-Link Attacker-Defender Games with Multiple Attack Technologies." Naval Research Logistics vol. 59 (6), 457-469. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2011). "A Blotto Game with Multi-Dimensional Incomplete Information." Economics Letters vol. 113 (3), 273-275. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2011). "Non-Partisan 'Get-Out-the-Vote' Efforts and Policy Outcomes." European Journal of Political Economy vol. 27 (4), 728-739. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D., Mauboussin, M.J. & Roberson, B (2010). "Asymmetric Conflicts with Endogenous Dimensionality." Korean Economic Review vol. 26 (2), 287-305. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B. (2009). "Inefficient Redistribution and Inefficient Redistributive Politics." Public Choice vol. 139 263-272. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B. (2009). "Is the 50-State Strategy Optimal?" Journal of Theoretical Politics vol. 21 213-236. | Related Website |
  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B. (2008). "Electoral Poaching and Party Identification." Journal of Theoretical Politics vol. 20 275-302. | Related Website |
  • Roberson, B. (2008). "Pork-Barrel Politics, Targetable Policies, and Fiscal Federalism." Journal of the European Economic Association vol. 6 819-844. | Related Website |
  • Roberson, B. (2006). "The Colonel Blotto Game." Economic Theory vol. 29 1-24. | Related Website |

Book Chapters

  • Kovenock, D. & Roberson, B (2012). "Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields." Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (edited by Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas) | Related Website |
  • Roberson, B (2011). "Allocation Games." Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science | Related Website |
  • Daniels School’s new leadership team in place

    Since being unveiled as Purdue University’s next big move one year ago, the Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. School of Business is gaining momentum, evidenced by a $50 million gift from the Lilly Endowment for the school’s new building, a $50 million gift from the Dean and Barbara White Foundation, and recognition as a game-changer in shaping the future of business education.

    Full story: Daniels School’s new leadership team in place

Contact

brobers@purdue.edu
Phone: (765) 494-4531
Office: KRAN 529

Area(s) of Expertise

Game Theory