Lin Qiu
Assistant Professor
Accounting
Education
Ph.D. in Accounting, New York University
M.A. in Economics, Peking University
B.A. in Economics, B.S. in Mathematics, Peking University
Why a ‘Level Playing Field’ May Not Always Produce the Best Incentives
Daniels School accounting researcher Lin Qiu shows how employee differences, team stability and carefully designed compensation can shape incentives and reduce coordination around lower effort.
Full story: Why a ‘Level Playing Field’ May Not Always Produce the Best Incentives
When Cracking Down on CEO Pay Backfires
Research from the Daniels School’s Lin Qiu shows why tougher rules on boards can backfire — shrinking a company’s market value even as they hand shareholders more power.
Contact
qiu223@purdue.edu
Phone: (765) 494-4271
Office: KRAN 422
Area(s) of Expertise
Accounting, Artificial Intelligence, Corporate Governance, Information Economics, Labor, Organizational Culture