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# The U.S. Economic Situation and Recent Monetary Policy Developments

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Kentucky Day with the Commissioner

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## This talk.

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- The U.S. economic outlook.
  - Fundamentals remain reasonably strong for 2011.
  - Key global uncertainties are likely to dissipate.
- Monetary policy.
  - QE2 has been successful as classic policy easing.
  - Inflation and inflation expectations have recently moved higher.
  - Controlling headline inflation as the key policy goal.
- Inflation targeting = modern commodity standard.


# The U.S. Economic Outlook

## Fundamentals remain reasonably strong for 2011.


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- Real GDP growth for the first quarter may be weaker than many expected a few months ago.
- However, the outlook for the remainder of 2011 remains reasonably strong.
- Labor market conditions have improved.
- Manufacturing activity remains robust.
- U.S. financial stress levels are near normal.
- A quartet of global uncertainties is likely to dissipate.

# Unemployment and Initial Claims



# Unemployment: comparing recoveries




## Private sector job growth improving

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
- About 1.6 million private sector jobs have been added to nonfarm payrolls over the last 12 months.
- That is about 138,000 per month.
- I expect this will accelerate during 2011.
  - U.S. firms have cash and are looking for opportunities to invest.

## Manufacturing is robust





## U.S. financial stress is at normal levels



## A quartet of uncertainties

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- In recent weeks, macroeconomic uncertainty has been on the rise from four key sources.
- One has been turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, and the associated uncertainty premium in oil prices.
- Another has been the natural disaster in Japan and the damaged nuclear reactors there.
- A third has been the U.S. fiscal situation and the possibility of a political stalemate.
- And finally, continued uncertainty regarding resolution of the European sovereign debt crisis.

## Prospects are for each situation to be contained

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- All four situations contain potential for escalation.
- If escalation occurs, all bets are off.
- Still, the most likely prospect is that all four are resolved without becoming global macroeconomic shocks.

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
# Monetary Policy Issues

## The effects of asset purchases in financial markets


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- The financial market effects of QE2 looked the same as if the FOMC had reduced the policy rate substantially.
- In particular, real interest rates declined, inflation expectations rose, the dollar depreciated, and equity prices rose.
- These are the “classic” financial market effects one might observe when the Fed eases monetary policy in ordinary times (that is, in an interest rate targeting environment).


# Expected inflation increased



# The dollar depreciated




## Real interest rates declined





# Equity prices increased



## Classic monetary policy easing

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- This experience shows that monetary policy can be eased aggressively even when the policy rate is near zero.


# Core Versus Headline Inflation

## Core versus headline inflation

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- Headline inflation refers to overall price indexes.
- Core inflation refers to the same indexes, but without the food and energy components.
- Core inflation is often smoother than headline inflation.
  - Core eliminates 20% or so of the prices in the index.
- The “core” concept has little theoretical backing. It is very arbitrary.

## CPI Inflation: Headline versus Core



## Headline inflation is the ultimate objective

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- Headline inflation is the ultimate objective of monetary policy with respect to prices.
- These are the prices households actually pay.
- The only reason to look at core is as an indicator for headline.
- Core inflation is not an objective in itself.

## Too much attention to core can mislead

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- From 2003-2006, core inflation was consistently below headline inflation.
- Core inflation averaged about 2.0 percent during this period.
- But headline inflation averaged about 2.9 percent for the CPI, and about 2.6 percent for the PCE.
  - That is substantial over a period of four years.
  - Core was not a good indicator of headline during this period.
  - Energy prices were rising and the economy was expanding.

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# Commodity standards




## Commodity standards

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- Commodity standards were last discussed in the 1970s, when U.S. inflation was high and variable.
- Ironically inflation is quite low today.
- Tying the currency to commodities when commodity prices are highly variable is questionable.

# Indexes of commodity prices



## Inflation targeting substitutes for a commodity standard

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- A commodity standard forces accountability on the central bank.
  - It did not always work, because governments sometimes changed the rate between the commodity and the currency.
- Inflation targeting is another way to force more accountability to the central bank and anchor longer-term expectations.
  - Make the central bank say what it intends to do, and hold the central bank accountable for achieving the goal.
- In this sense, inflation targeting is the modern successor to a commodity standard.
- Inflation targeting is a better choice in the current environment.

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# Conclusions

## Conclusion

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- U.S. growth prospects remain reasonably good for 2011.
- QE2 has shown that the Fed can conduct an effective monetary policy even when policy rates are near zero.
- Headline inflation, not core, is the key policy goal with respect to prices.
- Inflation targeting = modern commodity standard.



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